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In a generation of smartphones, wireless Internet, live stream-
ing music and video chats, the modes of human communication are
constantly evolving. One of the most popular forms of communication
in recent years is the use of social media and social networking web-
sites. Social media is a unique form of communication that involves not
only the receipt of information, such as reading a newspaper or listen-
ing to the radio, but the transference of information between users.
This back-and-forth exchange of information allows literally millions of
people around the world to connect and interact with one another.
Some social networking sites are designed for specific purposes, such
as sending or receiving messages. Others, such as the popular
Facebook and Twitter, incorporate a myriad of functions including the
sharing of photographs and video, "status" updates, and GPS location
"check-ins."
With all this information that is voluntarily published onto the
Internet, there is no surprise that individuals seek to use this informa-
tion during legal proceedings. For instance, an insurance company,
defending itself against a lawsuit for personal injuries, may want to
obtain pictures from the injured persons' social networking sites that
show them behaving in a manner not consistent with their alleged in-
juries. A criminal defendant may want to prove his alibi by showing
that his social networking sites' GPS locator places him far from the
scene of the crime. These and countless other scenarios raise signifi-
cant legal issues including what information can be "discovered,"
where this information can be obtained, and how it can be used.
The main purpose of this paper is to analyze how the discovery
of social media and social networking sites during litigation presents
the court system with very similar issues as traditional paper discov-
ery. This new technology, however, forces the courts to address these
* J.D., 2014, Florida A&M University College of Law. The author would like to recog-
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same issues in a different context. This discussion will first identify
what discoverable information is and how the increase of electronically
stored information has led to a new area of civil litigation discovery
referred to as electronic discovery, or e-discovery. It will also examine
the wide use and popularity of social networking sites and the explo-
sion of discoverable information contained on them. As discussed
below, the discovery of social media presents lawyers, judges and liti-
gants with all too familiar issues including ethical concerns, scope and
relevance of production, and privacy rights.
II. FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Discoverable Information
The American system of justice allows for broad discovery of in-
formation that may be relevant to a particular legal issue. Discovery is
defined as, "the pre-trial devices that can be used by one party to ob-
tain facts in order to assist the party's preparation for trial."' These
include, but are not limited to, requests for production of documents,
deposition testimony and interrogatories. In a federal lawsuit, parties
are required to automatically disclose certain information to each other
without being asked, such as the names, addresses and telephone
numbers of individuals likely to have discoverable information. 2 Such
information must be relevant within the scope of discovery defined in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 The rules state that, "parties
may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is rele-
vant to any party's claim or defense - including the existence,
description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any documents
or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons who
know of any discoverable matter."4
Whether the discoverable information is admissible as evidence
in court is a completely separate inquiry and subject to separate fed-
eral or state rules. "Relevant information need not be admissible at the
trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the dis-
covery of admissible evidence."5 Therefore, discoverable information is
not limited to evidence that is admissible at trial, but rather a broad
amount of information that is relevant to the pending case.
1. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 466 (6th ed. 1990).
2. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(1).
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B. Emergence of Electronic Discovery
Traditionally, discoverable information existed in the form of
paper documents and tangible items. Lawyers on both sides of a dis-
pute would gather and collect hundreds or even thousands of paper
documents that would have to be organized and sorted for relevance.
This would require a considerable amount of time and money, espe-
cially in complex litigation. However, as technology advanced, vast
amounts of information began to be stored electronically. Organiza-
tions started compiling information in electronic databases and
external hard drives, which allowed for a seemingly more practical way
to sort and access large amounts of information. At first glance, elec-
tronic storage seemed to lend itself to efficiency, however,
organizations soon found themselves requiring specialized computer
programs, trained individuals, and even litigation departments de-
voted to managing the sheer volume of information stored .6 You've got
new technology emerging that allows us to create and generate too
much information and, as a consequence we've had to have new tech-
nologies emerge to manage that information."7 Lawyers were left with
little guidance as to what procedures applied to the discovery of elec-
tronically stored information.
This prompted the 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure that included the addition of "electronically stored in-
formation," or ESI. For example, Rule 34 now provides that a party
may specifically request electronically stored information and specify
the form in which the ESI is to be produced.8 If a party does not specify
the form, ESI may be produced in the form it is ordinarily maintained
and the party need not produce ESI in more than one form.9 Rule 45
also addresses ESI in regards to third party subpoenas. The rule states
that a subpoena can specifically request the production of electroni-
cally stored information. However, "the person responding need not
provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that
the person identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue
burden or cost."' 0
6. SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN, DANIEL J. CAPRA & THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, ELECTRONIC
DISCOVERY AND DIGITAL EVIDENCE (2d ed. 2012).
7. Jacquelyn Holt, Social Media A Nightmare For E-Discovery, ZDNET (Jan. 11,
2013, 2:40pm), http://www.zdnet.com/social-media-a-nightmare-for-e-discovery-1339304
273.
8. FED. R. CIv. P. 34.
9. Id.
10. FED. R. Crv. P. 45.
241
FLORIDA A&M UNIV. LAW REVIEW Vol. 9:1:239
Courts have applied the Federal Rules of Civil Procedural to
electronically stored information in a similar manner as they would
other types of discoverable information. As with paper documents and
tangible items, parties have a duty to preserve electronically stored in-
formation when in reasonable anticipation of litigation." The failure to
preserve or destruction of electronically stored information can lead to
sanctions for spoliation of evidence.12
III. SOCIAL MEDIA
A. Popularity and Uses
More and more people are beginning to use social networking
sites as one of their primary forms of communication. It is estimated
that 91 percent of all adult internet users access or maintain social
networking sites on a regular basis.' 3 Recent statistical data from
eBizMBA, an "eBusiness Knowledgebase" dedicated to tracking and
ranking popular websites, cites the top 5 most popular social network-
ing sites as 1) Facebook, with 750,000,000 estimated unique monthly
visitors, 2) Twitter, with 250,000,000 estimated monthly visitors, 3)
Linkedln, with 110,000,000 estimated monthly visitors, 4) Pinterest,
with 85,500,000 estimated unique monthly visitors, and 5) MySpace,
with 70,500,000 estimated unique monthly visitors. 14
Not only are people using social networking sites to communi-
cate, they are also publishing vast amounts of their personal
information to the public. It is estimated that every minute, Facebook
users share 684,478 pieces of content; Tumblr blog owners publish
27,778 new posts; YouTube users upload 48 hours of new video; Four-
square users perform 2,083 check-ins; Flickr users add 3,125 new
photos; and Instagram users share 3,600 new photos.' 5
11. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
12. Id.
13. Justine Murphy & Adrian Fontecilla, Social Media Evidence In Criminal
Proceedings: An Uncertain Frontier, BLOOMBERG LAW (Mar. 20, 2013), http://about.
bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/social-media-evidence-in-criminal-
proceedings-an-uncertain-frontier-by-justin-p-murphy-and-adrian-fontecilla.
14. Top 15 Most Popular Social Networking Sites, EBIzMBA, http://www.ebizmba.com/
articles/social-networking-websites (last visited Mar. 5, 2013).
15. Justine Murphy & Adrian Fontecilla, Social Media Evidence In Criminal
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Most of these social networking sites include basic components
such as the ability to create a profile page, upload digital photographs
and video, send public or private messages, and allow other users ac-
cess to this information. Some sites allow for more detailed information
to be published such as a user's education, current residence, and rela-
tionship status. These sites will also typically include their own search
engine for finding people to connect with and social groups to join.
B. Social Networking Policies
Virtually every social networking site has some type of privacy
policy in place to protect the information of its users from being dis-
seminated to the public. Facebook gives users three options when
sharing information. They can choose whether the information they
post is available to the public, friends only, or a customized version of
the two.' 6 There are, however, many instances in which these privacy
policies allow for user information to be shared for certain purposes,
such as advertising or legal request, by virtue of simply enrolling for an
account. For instance, the social networking site Instagram, which is
primarily dedicated to the sharing of photographs, has a privacy policy
that states, "[w]e may access, preserve and share your information in
response to a legal request (like a search warrant, court order or sub-
poena) if we have a good faith belief that the law requires us to do
S0."17 Instagram also states that ". . you hereby grant to Instagram a
non-exclusive, fully paid and royalty-free, transferable, sub-licensable,
worldwide license to use the Content that you post on or through the
Service. . ."Is So, by signing up for a social media account with In-
stagram, a user expressly allows the site to share their personal
photographs to third parties without notice or compensation.
Many sites have minimum age requirements, such as Facebook
and MySpace, which require a user to be at least 13 years old to use
the website.19 LinkedIn, a social networking site dedicated to career
professionals, requires that users be at least 18 years old to join and
16. Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info
(last visited Mar. 18, 2013).
17. Privacy Policy, INSTAGRAM, http://instagram.com/abouttlegal/privacy (last visited
Jan. 29, 2013).
18. Terms Of Use, INSTAGRAM, http://instagram.com/about/legal/terms (last visited Jan.
29, 2013).
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used to require an invitation, but is now available for membership with
a valid e-mail address. 20
Most social networking sites also collect and store basic infor-
mation about the user, such as the user's name, email address,
birthday, and gender. Other information is frequently collected for sup-
posedly enhancing the social networking experience. Facebook, for
example, receives information when the user interacts with Facebook,
such as whenever the user looks at another user's profile page, sends
or receives a message, or posts photos and videos, including the
metadata associated with each post (date, time and place).21
Some social networking sites have had their policies attacked
on legal grounds for lack of notice. For example, Facebook is currently
involved in a pending class action settlement that claims Facebook
"unlawfully used the names, profile pictures, photographs, likenesses,
and identities of Facebook users in the United States to advertise or
sell products and services through Sponsored Stories without obtaining
those users' consent."22 The Electronic Privacy Information Center
(EPIC) has also filed multiple complaints with the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) alleging that Facebook has engaged in unfair and
deceptive trade practices by the way they share information with third-
party application developers and by not making it clear to users that
Facebook uses "cookies" to track their internet activity.23
IV. ETHICAL ISSUES
While much of the information posted on social networking
websites is accessible to the public, some users exercise the option to
allow their posts to be viewed by "friends only," or those that have been
pre-approved by the user with permission to access their information.
Thus, lawyers must be cautious in deciding how and when to obtain
information contained on social networking sites.
The Philadelphia Bar Association's Professional Guidance Com-
mittee published an opinion in response to an inquiry regarding
accessing a non-represented witness's social media accounts. 24 The at-
20. ENTREPRENEUR, http://social-media.entrepreneur.com/q/39/8525/What-are-the-
requirements-to-join-the-LinkedIn-social-media-network (last visited Mar. 20, 2013).
21. Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info
(last visited Mar. 18, 2013).
22. Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., GCC, http://www.fraleyfacebooksettlement.com (last
visited Feb. 6, 2013).
23. Social Networking Privacy, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, http://epic.
org/privacy/socialnet/#back (last visited Mar. 14, 2013).
24. Philadelphia Bar Op. 2009-02 (Mar. 2009).
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torney believed that the witness's Facebook and MySpace pages
contained information that could be used to impeach her deposition
testimony at trial.25 The attorney sought to access this information di-
rectly but realized that he would need the witness's permission to do
So. 2 6 Instead of asking the witness directly for permission to access her
social networking sites (which she would most likely deny), the attor-
ney proposed to have a third party "friend" the witness and report back
to the attorney the information revealed. 27 The third party would not
disclose the fact that he or she is only "friending" the witness simply to
obtain personal information to supply the attorney with ammunition to
impeach her testimony. 28 The attorney believed that this would be sim-
ilar, in practice, to a private investigator following and videotaping a
personal injury plaintiff.2 9
The Committee responded that, not only would this conduct vio-
late two of the Committee's ethical rules, but also that it was highly
deceptive. The Committed warned that,
It omits a highly material fact, namely, that the third party who
asks to be allowed access to the witness's pages is doing so only
because he or she is intent on obtaining information and sharing it
with a lawyer for use in a lawsuit to impeach the testimony of the
witness. The omission would purposefully conceal that fact from the
witness for the purpose of inducing the witness to allow access,
when she may not do so if she knew the third person was associated
with the inquirer and the true purpose of the access was to obtain
information for the purpose of impeaching her testimony.30
The New York State Bar published a similar opinion regarding
the use of information posted on Facebook or MySpace pages by a party
to a lawsuit, other than the lawyer's client.31 In this scenario, the at-
torney did not propose to "friend" the party but to simply access what
was already available to the public.32 The Committee here relied pri-
marily upon the previous opinion of The Philadelphia Bar Association's
Professional Guidance Committee. However, they distinguished that
the Philadelphia scenario concerned an unrepresented witness. Here,






30. Philadelphia Bar Op., supra note 24.
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mittee went on to state that, "obtaining information about a party
available in the Facebook or MySpace profile is similar to obtaining
information that is available in publicly accessible online or print me-
dia, or through a subscription research service. . .and that is plainly
permitted."3 4
While the opinion did not specifically address this issue, the
Committee made reference in a footnote that an attempt to "friend" a
represented party could run afoul of the "no-contact" rule, which pro-
hibits a lawyer from communicating with a represented party without
the prior consent of that party's lawyer.35 Ultimately, no ethical rules
are violated by accessing a party's social networking site as long as the
lawyer does not "friend" the party or direct a third person to do so. 3 6
V. BATTLE IN THE COURTROOM
A. Scope of Discovery
Parties frequently disagree on how much of their social
networking site should be produced and whether their social network-
ing sites should be produced at all. The court in EEOC v. Simply
Storage Management recognized that there were not many published
decisions to provide guidance on the issue of the discovery of social
networking sites, but, nonetheless, applied the "basic discovery princi-
ples in a novel context."3 7 In that case, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a complaint against Simply
Storage Management (Simply Storage), alleging sexual harassment
and damages for emotional pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life,
post-traumatic stress disorder, and the like.38 Simply Storage sent dis-
covery requests seeking the production of essentially all of the
claimants' social media content on Facebook and MySpace. 39 EEOC ob-
jected that the discovery requests were overbroad and not relevant. 40
The court began first by laying out general principles that could be
applied to the discovery of social networking sites (SNS). They stated,
1. SNS content is not shielded from discovery simply because
it is "locked" or "private.".
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at n.1.
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2. SNS content must be produced when it is relevant to a
claim or defense...
3. Allegations of depression, stress disorders, and like injuries
do not automatically render all SNS communications rele-
vant, but the scope of relevant communications is broader
than that urged by the EEOC.41
Reasoning that social networking sites may contain information that
could reveal when and to what degree emotional injury occurred, the
court held that the discovery of the claimants' social networking sites
was appropriate. 4 2
After establishing some workable guidelines regarding social
networking sites, the courts' next challenge was to determine the scope
of permissible discovery. Applying their established guidelines the
court held that, ". . .the appropriate scope of relevance is any profiles,
postings, or messages (including status updates, wall comments,
causes joined, groups joined, activity streams, blog entries) and SNS
applications.. .that reveal. . .any emotion, feeling, or mental state .. "43
Similarly, in Romano v. Steelcase, the court granted the defen-
dant's motion for access to the plaintiffs Facebook and MySpace
accounts, including all previously deleted material. 4 4 In that case, the
plaintiff brought a personal injury action in New York alleging dam-
ages for permanent injuries and loss of enjoyment of life. 45 The
defendant found that the public portion of the plaintiffs Facebook and
MySpace pages showed her smiling happily outside of her home and
that she had traveled to Florida and Pennsylvania during the time pe-
riod that she claimed her injuries were so severe she could not leave
her home.4 6 The court held that,
In light of the fact that the public portions of plaintiffs social
networking sites contain material that is contrary to her claims and
deposition testimony, there is a reasonable likelihood that the pri-
vate portions of her sites may contain further evidence such as
information with regard to her activities and enjoyment of life, all of
which are material and relevant to the defense of this action.
Preventing defendant from accessing plaintiffs private postings on
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Simply Storage, 270 F.R.D. at 436.
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Facebook and MySpace would be in direct contravention to the lib-
eral disclosure policy in New York State.47
While the above referenced cases indicate a trend towards
broad discovery of social networking sites, the following case shows
that the scope of discovery is not unlimited. In Mackelprang v. Fidelity
Nat'l Title Agency of Nev., the court denied the defendant's motion to
compel a consent letter authorizing the defendants to access private
messages contained on the plaintiffs two MySpace accounts. 48 In that
case, the plaintiff sued her employer for, among other things, sexual
harassment and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress.4 9 The plaintiff alleged that two vice-presidents of the company
coerced her into numerous sexual acts under the threat that she and
her husband would be fired if she did not do so. 5 0 She also alleged that,
as a direct result, she attempted to commit suicide twice, was hospital-
ized in a mental health facility, and was diagnosed with post-traumatic
stress disorder, major depressive disorder, and panic disorder.5 '
During discovery, the defendants served a subpoena on MyS-
pace for the production of private emails between the plaintiff and any
other person.52 MySpace responded with publicly available information
but refused to produce the plaintiffs private emails without a search
warrant or letter of consent. 53 Thereafter, defendants sent a "Consent
and Authorization For Private Messages" letter to the plaintiff, which
she refused to sign because the information they sought was "irrele-
vant and improperly invades plaintiffs privacy."54 In their argument
that the plaintiff was a willing participant and actually encouraged the
alleged sexual misconduct, the defendant's pointed out that the plain-
tiff had two MySpace accounts, one that identified her as single with
no kids and another that identified her as married with six children.55
They also argued that,
Mackelprang was using the private messaging functionality on
MySpace to facilitate the same types of electronic and physical rela-
tionships she has characterized as sexual harassment in her
Complaint. If in fact Mackelprang was voluntarily pursuing, en-
47. Id. at 654.
48. Mackelprang v. Fidelity Nat'1 Title Agency of Nev., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2379 (D.






54. Mackelprang, LEXIS 2379 at 6.
55. Id.
248
2013 SOCIAL MEDIA AND ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY
couraging, or even engaging in extra-marital relationships on or
though MySpace, then Fidelity has a right to use this information
to rebut Mackelprang's sexual harassment claims and impeach her
credibility.56
The district court disagreed and held that the defendants were engag-
ing in a "fishing expedition" and would need something "beyond mere
speculation" to support their claim.57 The court reasoned that,
Ordering plaintiff to execute the consent and authorization form for
release of all of the private email messages on plaintiffs MySpace.
com internet accounts would allow defendants to cast too wide a net
for any information that might be relevant and discoverable. It
would, of course, permit defendants to also obtain irrelevant infor-
mation, including possibly sexually explicit or sexually promiscuous
email communications between plaintiff and third persons, which
are not relevant, admissible or discoverable.58
B. Relevance of Requested Discovery
Similar to the issue of the permissible scope of discovery, is the
relevance of the requested information. As stated previously, relevant
information need only be "reasonably calculated to lead to the discov-
ery of admissible evidence." 59 Courts have shown the need to balance a
party's right to obtain relevant information with a party's desire to pro-
tect such information from disclosure.
The court in Barnes v. CUS Nashville, LLC took a unique ap-
proach. There, the magistrate judge offered to create his own Facebook
account and have two non-parties to which the discovery was directed
accept him as a "friend" so that he could review their photographs and
comments in camera to determine which, if any, contained relevant
information.60
Similarly in Bass v. Miss Porter's School, the court reviewed
over 750 pages of wall postings, messages, and pictures from the plain-
tiff's Facebook in camera to determine its relevance.6 ' There, the
plaintiff filed suit against her prep school for not protecting her against
severe bullying and harassment.62 The defendants sought production
56. Id. at 8.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 21.
59. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1).
60. Barnes v. CUS Nashville, LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143892 (M.D.Tenn.2010).
61. Bass v. Miss Porter's School, Civil No. 3:08CV1807, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99916
(D. Conn. Oct 27, 2009).
62. Id.
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of all communications related to the alleged teasing and taunting the
plaintiff was subjected to on Facebook.63 The plaintiff objected on the
grounds that such information was irrelevant and immaterial, and not
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 64
The court overruled the plaintiffs objection, holding that "Facebook us-
age depicts a snapshot of the user's relationships and state of mind at
the time of the content's posting," therefore the Facebook communica-
tions were "clearly relevant."65
In contrast, the New York Supreme Court in McCann v. Harly-
esville Ins. Co. of New York held that the defendant's motion to compel
authorization for the plaintiffs Facebook account and disclosure of
photographs was properly denied as "overly broad."66 In this unin-
sured/underinsured motorist action, the defendant alleged that the
information contained on the plaintiffs Facebook account was relevant
to determine if the plaintiff sustained serious injuries.67 The court rea-
soned that since the defendant "failed to establish a factual predicate
with respect to the relevancy of the evidence. . .defendant essentially
sought permission to conduct 'a fishing expedition' into plaintiffs
Facebook account based on the mere hope of finding relevant evi-
dence."6 Nevertheless, the court did not preclude the defendants from
accessing the plaintiffs Facebook account entirely. They held that,
while the current motion to compel was properly denied, the lower
court abused its discretion by prohibiting the defendant from seeking
production of the plaintiffs Facebook account at some time in the
future.69
C. Spoliation Sanctions
Another issue common to discovery is what to do when a party
destroys or does not preserve discoverable information. As previously
stated, the failure to preserve or the destruction of electronically stored
information can lead to sanctions for spoliation of evidence.70 These
sanctions can include "dismissal of a claim or granting judgment in
favor of a prejudiced party; suppression of evidence; an adverse infer-
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 3-4.
66. McCann v. Harleysville Ins. Co. of New York, 78 A.D.3d 1524 (N.Y. 2010).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1525.
69. Id.
70. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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ence, referred to as the spoliation inference; fines; and attorneys' fees
and costs."7 ' A spoliation inference "permits a jury to draw an adverse
inference that the spoliated evidence might or would have been unfa-
vorable to the position of the offending party."72
While there is little information available regarding spoliation
sanctions in cases involving the failure to preserve information con-
tained on social networking sites, the district court of New Jersey
provides some guidance. In Katiroll v. Kati Roll, the court applied the
usual requirements of a spoliation inference to the context of Facebook
pages.73 In this trademark infringement case, the plaintiff requested
spoliation sanctions against the defendant for taking down his
Facebook pages that contained infringing images and for changing his
Facebook profile picture that displayed the infringing "trade dress."74
The court applied a four factor balancing test: 1) the evidence must be
within the party's control, 2) there must be actual suppression or with-
holding of evidence, 3) the evidence was relevant to claims or defenses,
and 4) it was reasonably foreseeable that the evidence would be discov-
erable. 75 As to the second factor, some courts have held that the
spoliation must be intentional to warrant an adverse inference instruc-
tion; while others have held that simple negligence is enough.76 Here,
the court held that the degree of fault should be based upon the
amount of prejudice to the opposing party, that is, where the prejudice
is substantial, negligence is sufficient to warrant a spoliation infer-
ence, and, where the prejudice is minimal, intentional conduct is
required to warrant a spoliation inference.77
In weighing these factors, the district court concluded that
there was not much at issue concerning the first and third factors,
holding that the evidence was in the defendant's control and was rele-
vant to the claim.78 The main issues derived from factors two and four,
the amount of fault and foreseeability, respectively. The court noted
that "the change of a profile picture on Facebook is a common occur-
rence" and that "it would not have been immediately clear that
changing [the defendant's] profile picture would undermine discovera-
71. Kounelis v. Sherrer, 529 F. Supp. 2d 503, 519 (D.N.J. 2008).
72. Veloso v. Western Bedding Supply Co., 281 F.Supp.2d 743, 746 (D.N.J. 2003).
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ble evidence."79 The court ultimately held that, because of this,
spoliation sanctions were inappropriate, but that the defendant should
briefly change his profile picture back to the allegedly infringing pic-
ture so that the plaintiffs may print posts they believe to be relevant.ao
While the Katiroll court did not impose sanctions for spoliation,
its analysis is indicative of how courts will likely look at motions for
sanctions regarding spoliation of information on social networking
sites in the future.
D. Right to Privacy and the Stored Communications Act
"Probably the most frequently litigated issue surrounding dis-
covery of social networking site information is the user's right to
privacy."81 It is undisputed that social networking sites contain per-
sonal information, but judges have struggled over when this personal
information must be disclosed during litigation and when a person re-
tains a right to privacy. Nonetheless, it seems that, for now, a person's
right to privacy is diminished when it comes to information contained
on social networking sites. For instance, a Canadian court recognized
that,
It]o permit a party claiming very substantial damages for loss of
enjoyment of life to hide behind self-set privacy controls on a web-
site, the primary purpose of which is to enable people to share
information about how they lead their social lives, risks depriving
the opposite party of access to material that may be relevant to en-
suring a fair trial.82
Similarly, the Romano court recognized that,
[Als neither Facebook nor MySpace guarantee complete privacy,
plaintiff has no legitimate reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy. . .[tihus when plaintiff created her Facebook and MySpace
accounts, she consented to the fact that her personal information
would be shared with others, notwithstanding her privacy settings.
Indeed, that is the very nature and purpose of these social network-
ing sites else they would cease to exist.8 3
However, a person does not lose their right to privacy entirely simply
because they share and communicate information on social networking
sites.
79. Kati Roll, LEXIS 85212 at 10-11.
80. Id.
81. Kristen L. Mix, Discovery of Social Media, 5 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. 120, 127 (2011).
82. Leduc v. Roman, 2009 CanLlI 6838 (ON S.C.).
83. Romano v. Steelcase, 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 656-57 (2010).
252
2013 SOCIAL MEDIA AND ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY
1. Right of Privacy
The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution provides that,
"[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated.. ."84 The United States Supreme Court has interpreted this to
mean that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places" where
the person has a "reasonable expectation of privacy."85 The Court ap-
plies a two-part test. First, a person must exhibit an "actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' 8 6 They also
reasoned that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even
in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."87
In an attempt to apply this privacy right to electronically stored
information, Congress enacted the Stored Communications Act (SCA)
in 1986 as part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.88
The SCA was enacted because the advent of the Internet presented
a host of potential privacy breaches that the Fourth Amendment
does not address. . . [It] creates a set of Fourth Amendment-like
privacy protections by statute, regulating the relationship between
government investigators and service providers in possession of
users' private information. . . Although the Fourth Amendment
may require no more than a subpoena to obtain e-mails, the statute
confers greater privacy protection.89
2. Stored Communications Act Applied to Discovery of Social Media
The leading case on the Stored Communications Act and its ap-
plicability to social media is Crispin v. Christian Audigier.90 In that
case, an artist filed suit against a manufacturer of street-wear apparel
alleging breach of contract and copyright infringement.9' The defend-
ants served subpoenas duces tecum on several social networking
84. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
85. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
86. Id. at 361.
87. Id. at 351.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 2701, et. seq.
89. Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator's
Guide to Amending It, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1208, 1209-13 (2004).
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websites, including Facebook and MySpace, seeking the production of,
amongst other things, all communications that related to the plaintiff,
defendant, or any of the sublicensee defendants. 9 2 The plaintiff filed a
motion to quash the subpoenas on the grounds that the subpoenas
were overbroad, sought irrelevant information, and sought electronic
communications that were protected from disclosure under the Stored
Communications Act. 9 3 The magistrate judge ruled that the Stored
Communications Act did not apply because "the SCA prohibits only the
voluntary disclosure of information by ECS [electronic communication
service] providers, not disclosure compelled by subpoena."9 4 The judge
further concluded that third-party businesses are not ECS providers
under the Act and the requested communications were not held in
"electronic storage" as defined in the statute.9 5
On appeal, the district court recognized the difficulty in apply-
ing the Stored Communications Act to issues involving modern
technology because "the SCA was enacted before the advent of the
World Wide Web in 1990 and before the introduction of the web
browser in 1994."96 They decided several issues regarding the SCA and
discovery of social media including standing, whether the social
networking sites are service providers under the statute, and whether
the requested communications constitute electronic storage within the
meaning of the statute.
a. Standing to Move to Quash a Third Party Subpoena
Under the SCA
Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that the
court must quash a subpoena that "requires disclosure of privileged or
other protected matter. . ."97 "Ordinarily a party has no standing to
seek to quash a subpoena issued to someone who is not a party to the
action, unless the objecting party claims some personal right or privi-
lege with regard to the documents sought."98
In the Crispin case, the defendants argued that the magistrate
judge was correct in ruling that the plaintiffs did not have standing to
move to quash the subpoenas duces tecum to Facebook and MySpace
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 7.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 14.
97. FED. R. CIv. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(iii).
98. 9A CHARLES WRIGHT & ARTHiR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2459
(3d. ed. 2008).
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because the Stored Communications Act states that, "[n]o cause of ac-
tion shall lie in any court against any provider of wire or electronic
communication service. . . in accordance with the terms of a court or-
der, warrant, subpoena, statutory authorization or certification under
this chapter."99 The district court rejected the defendant's argument
and held that the plaintiff did have standing to bring a motion to quash
the subpoenas because "an individual has a personal right in informa-
tion in his or her profile and inbox on a social networking site. . .the
same way that an individual has a personal right in employment and
bank records."100
b. Electronic Communication Service (ECS) Provider vs. Remote
Computing Service (RCS) Provider
After determining that the plaintiffs had standing to move to
quash the subpoenas, the district court then had to determine whether
Facebook and MySpace are electronic communication service (ECS)
providers or, alternatively, remote computing service (RCS) providers,
under the Stored Communications Act. This determination was crucial
to the case because ECS providers are prohibited from "knowingly
divulg[ing] to any person or entity the contents of a communication
while in electronic storage by that service."101 RCS providers are simi-
larly prohibited from "knowingly divulg[ing] to any person or entity the
contents of any communication which is carried or maintained on that
service." 102 No court had previously decided whether social networking
sites are ECS or RCS providers.
In making their determination, the court undertook a thorough
analysis of the language of the statute. An ECS provider is defined as
"any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or re-
ceive wire or electronic communications."103 An RCS provider is
defined as "the provision to the public of computer storage or process-
ing services by means of an electronic communications system." 104 An
electronic communications system is "any wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photooptical or photoelectronic facilities for the transmission of wire or
99. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(e).
100. Crispin v. Christian Audigier, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52832, 22 (C.D. Cal. May 26,
2010).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1)(b).
102. Id. § 2702(a)(2).
103. Id. § 2510(15).
104. Id. § 2711(2).
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electronic communications, and any computer facilities or related elec-
tronic equipment for the electronic storage of such communications."105
The magistrate judge initially ruled that Facebook and MyS-
pace were not ECS providers because their messaging services are
used "solely for public display."106 The district court disagreed and held
that the sites are ECS providers because, first, the statute extends to
"any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or re-
ceive wire or electronic communications ,"107 and second, the sites
provide private as well as public messaging.108 They further reasoned
that, "Facebook wall postings and the MySpace comments are not
strictly 'public,' but are accessible only to those users plaintiff
selects."109 Therefore, "Facebook and MySpace provide an electronic
venue to communicate. . ." and qualify as ECS providers prohibited
from disclosing communications pursuant to the SCA." 0
c. Electronic Storage
Since the district court found that both Facebook and MySpace
are ECS providers under the SCA, their final inquiry was to determine
if the requested communications constituted electronic storage under
the statute."1 1 The SCA defines electronic storage as "(A) any tempo-
rary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication
incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and (B) any storage of
such communication by an electronic communication service for pur-
poses of backup protection of such communication."1 12 The defendants
argued that the requested communications did not constitute elec-
tronic storage because they are neither temporary in nature nor stored
for backup purposes.113 The district court disagreed and held that,
"[a]s respects messages that have not yet been opened, those entities
operate as ECS providers and the messages are in electronic stor-
age. . .As respects messages that have been opened and retained by
Crispin. . .[Facebook and MySpace] operate as RCS providers provid-
105. Id. § 2510(14).
106. Crispin v. Christian Audigier, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52832, 41 (C.D. Cal. May 26,
2010).
107. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (emphasis added).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 42.
110. Id. at 48.
111. Id.
112. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17).
113. Crispin v. Christian Audigier, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52832 (C.D. Cal. May 26,
2010).
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ing storage services. . ."114 Ultimately, the court granted the plaintiffs
motion to quash the subpoenas seeking the Facebook and MySpace pri-
vate messages but vacated and remanded to the magistrate judge the
issue of whether the Facebook wall postings and MySpace comments
are discoverable based on the plaintiffs privacy settings.11 5
The Crispin court demonstrated, for the first time, that the
Stored Communications Act can be applied to the discovery of informa-
tion contained on social networking sites and individuals can still
retain some degree of privacy with respect to the information they
choose to keep private. 116
VI. CONCLUSION
The future of electronic discovery and social networking sites is
moving forward at a rapid pace and the legal system is challenged to
keep up. Fortunately, the Federal Rules of Civil Discovery have recog-
nized the growth of e-discovery and have adopted amendments to
address new concerns. Also, judges, lawyers and litigants are finding
that traditional discovery issues are becoming more prevalent in the
discovery of social networking sites. In the first half of 2012 alone,
there were over 320 published cases where social media played a sig-
nificant role. 117
As demonstrated, the ethical and legal issues presented during
discovery of electronically stored information in social media are noth-
ing new to the court system. Lawyers must first ensure that they are
not engaging in unethical behavior when seeking discovery of informa-
tion contained on a party or witness's social networking site. State bar
associations recognize that lawyers may easily obtain publicly availa-
ble information but have little tolerance for misleading or deceptive
tactics.
The electronic discovery requests themselves must be tailored
to the appropriate scope and relevance of the claims or defenses at is-
sue. Courts have recognized that, in many cases, social networking
sites contain relevant information, but they will not let parties engage
114. Id. at 65.
115. Id.
116. See also Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Group, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88702 (D.N.J.
Sept. 5, 2009) (holding that restaurant managers maliciously accessing a private employee
chat group on MySpace.com without authorization on five occasions warranted punitive
damages under the SCA).
117. X1 DISCOVERY, Published Cases Involving Social Media Evidence (First Half 2012),
http://www.xldiscovery.com/social-mediacases.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2013).
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in "fishing expeditions" on a mere hunch that discoverable information
could be located.
Courts have also shown their willingness to impose sanctions on
parties who do not follow the rules of civil discovery. If discoverable
information is not properly preserved or produced, the court may step
in to punish the violating party and lessen the burden imposed on the
prejudiced party. As judges become more familiar with social media
and how social networking sites operate, sanctions may become more
common with e-discovery violations.
The right of privacy will, undoubtedly, remain at the heart of
many e-discovery issues. Parties will frequently argue that they retain
a right of privacy to the information published on their social network-
ing sites and opposing parties will frequently maintain that the need
for such information outweighs the privacy interest. Although Con-
gress has attempted to address these privacy issues in the Stored
Communications Act, the 1986 federal statute is outdated and difficult
to apply to modern day technologies. Judges ultimately have the re-
sponsibility of balancing the relevance of the information being sought
against the privacy interest of the individual.
Even with this relatively new world of social media, these same
legal issues still remain. It is the approach and application of the tradi-
tional rules of civil discovery to this new technology that makes
electronic discovery of social networking sites such a unique and evolv-
ing area of the law.
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